Teoria da Agência: Uma Avaliação e Revisão


  • Kathleen M. Eisenhardt Universidade de Stanford




teoria da agência , teoria das organizações, Revisão da literatura


A teoria da agência é uma importante teoria, ainda que seja controversa. Este artigo traz uma revisão sobre a teoria da agencia, suas contribuições para a teoria das organizações e do trabalho empírico existente bem como desenvolve proposições testáveis. As conclusões são de que a teoria da agência oferece uma visão única sobre sistemas de informação, incerteza dos resultados, incentivos risco e é uma perspectiva empírica válida, principalmente quando combinada com perspectivas complementares. A recomendação principal é incorporar uma perspectiva agência em estudos sobre os muitos problemas que têm uma estrutura cooperativa.


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Como Citar

M. Eisenhardt, K. (2015). Teoria da Agência: Uma Avaliação e Revisão. RGC - Revista De Governança Corporativa, 2(1). https://doi.org/10.21434/IberoamericanJCG.v2i1.14